Fyri at seta í gildi bann, sum má roknast sum uppsøgn av 48 ára samstarvsavtalu, má metast rættast, at prógv fyriliggja. Fiskur er matvøra, sum alla tíðina hevur verið undantikin boykotti. Tað ger próvbyrðuna størri.

Politikarar, sum stuðla banni, hava fleiri ymiskar frágreiðingar. Men prógv hava teir ongi.

Fyri at lætta um, havi eg kopiera tekstin hjá ES, har sagt verður, hví nevndu reiðarí eru boykotta.

Við at lesa hetta, vita vit í Føroyum, at ein partur av hesum er lodrøtt lygn, nevniliga tann um njósning. Somuleiðis parturin um káplar við Svalbard, har NRK sigur, at teir skulu verða 2 metrar undir havbotninum. Vit síggja eisini, at tey lesa russiskar kunngerðir, sum fanin lesur bíbliuna, í hvussu so er tann partin um at fiskiskip kunnu brúkast í krígsstøðu.

Men alt er ikki lygn, t.d. passar tað, at hetta eru fiskiskip.

Eitt annað vit hoyra er: Um vit ikki hava álit á fregnartænastuni... Naiviteturin á Løgting og í Landsstýri tykist rættuliga stórur.

Ovasti embætismaðurin hjá Powell, hevur fleiri ferðir greitt frá, hvussu teir blivu manipuleraðir at halda, at Iraq hevði kjarnorkuvápn. Hetta hendi, hóast fregnartænastan visti, at Iraq ikki hevði kjarnorkuvápn. Colin Powell var tá Uttanríkisráðharri í USA.

Gass álopi í Sýria var falskt og tað visti fregnartænastan, men fortaldi nakað annað og tað bleiv næstan kríggj, men Obama tyktist ov veikur til kríggj. Seinni vísti tað seg, at álopið var fals.

Russia collusion, sum 51 persónar váttaðu at ljóða røtt, , var fals, men brúkt av CIA og FBI, hóast FBI og CIA vistu tað var fals, móti sjálvum presidentinum í USA!

Norska fregnartænastan og mynduleikar annars hava eisini sagt ósætt og villeitt um káplarnar á Svalbard. Og pressan hevur borið lygnina víðari. Og politikarar bera somu ósannindir enn í dag.

Danska fregnartænastan bleiv í gjár dømd í rættinum.

Viðhvørt eiga vit at ivast í, um fregnartænastur yvirhøvur arbeiða fyri avvarðandi mynduleikar og annars fólki.

Tá tær gera hetta, móti sínum egnu, er naivt at halda, at vit kunnu hava álit á teimum.

Fregnartænasta, er ikki ein spurningur um álit. Fregnartænasta er spurningur um prógv. Og tað eru prógvini, sum vit mangla!

 

Eivind Jacobsen

Strendur

 

P.S. Reglur fyri sjókáplar, ES grundgeving fyri at boykotta, AI samandráttur um sjókáplar við Svalbard

 

Hetta sigur NRK um reglurnar fyri sjókáplar:

Kablene er merket av på norske sjøkart, men det er ikke forbudt å fiske over dem. Utenfor Svalbard skal kablene ligge to meter under havbunnen i områder der det fiskes.

https://www.nrk.no/nordland/xl/russiske-tralere-krysset-kabler-i-vesteralen-og-svalbard-for-brudd-1.16007084

Fyri tey sum ikki hava skil fyri troli, kann skoytast uppí, at eru káplar 2 metur undir, so er óhugsandi, at botntrol skaðar káplar. Og um so var, so hevði tað sæst. Kápilin bleiv jú gjørdur aftur!!

 

Hetta er grundgevingin frá ES fyria boykotta, Norebo,

Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.

Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

 

Hetta er grundgevingin hjá ES, fyri at boykotta Murman Seafood.

Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

 

 

Hetta sigur AI um hendingina!!

 

AI Overview

In January 2022, one of the two fiberoptic cables connecting Svalbard to mainland Norway suffered a cable break, leading to temporary loss of internet and communication services. The failure occurred between 130 and 230 kilometers from Longyearbyen, where the seabed is very deep. While initially there was speculation about human activity, the Svalbard cable cut was ultimately deemed a mysterious incident, with the Norwegian police closing their investigation without determining a definitive cause. 

What Happened

Date:
The break was first detected on the morning of January 7, 2022. 

Location:
The fault was located in a deep-water section of the cable, between 130 and 230 kilometers from Longyearbyen, where the seabed plunges to about 2,700 meters. 

Cause:
A shunt failure in the cable led to the loss of power to the signal repeaters, disrupting the connection. 

Service Restoration:
Data traffic was restored on January 18, 2022, eleven days after the signal failure was discovered. 

Consequences and Investigation

Impact:
The cable provided the internet and communication link for Svalbard, including the important SvalSat satellite ground station. The disruption was a temporary loss of the backup capacity, as the primary service remained unaffected. 

Speculation and Mystery:
Norwegian media quickly raised theories about intentional, man-made damage. However, after an investigation by the Troms police, the case was closed in March 2022, and the police could not determine the cause of the cable break. 

Ongoing Monitoring:
Space Norway, the operator of the cables, continued to monitor the situation and work on a full repair.